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We solve for equilibrium portfolios in a two-country, two-good dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model with consumption home bias. We compare two
dierent asset trading regimes. In the rst, households in each country trade equity
claims on their underlying stochastic endowments; in the second, households trade
locally-denominated bonds. We derive locally accurate closed-form solutions for steady-
state portfolios under each regime. The model can predict realistic equity home bias
and bond diversication if the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods is suciently low. However, for commonly used parameter values,
the standard two-good model understates bond diversication and overstates equity
diversication.
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11 Introduction
The modern global economy is characterized by large cross-border holdings of many kinds
of nancial assets (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2005]). However, observed international diver-
sication is often greater in bonds than in equities. For example, at the end of 2007, foreign
holdings of U.S. corporate bonds amounted to 28% of the outstanding value of those bonds,
while foreign holdings of U.S. equities represented only 14% of the outstanding value of U.S.
stocks. Foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities were even higher, at 48% of outstanding
value (Federal Reserve Flow of Funds). Figure 1 shows how these shares have evolved for
the U.S. from 1998 to 2007. Although all shares have gradually risen as nancial market
integration has accelerated, the pattern across assets is consistent: foreigners tend to hold
relatively larger shares of U.S. debt than equity. Large foreign holdings of domestic debt
are also prominent in the U.K. (32%, U.K. Debt Management Oce), France (60%, Agence
France Tr esor) and other OECD countries.1
This paper asks a simple question: can a two-country, two-good endowment model
generate realistic portfolio diversication in debt and equity? We show that for a suciently
low intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, the model can
indeed predict home bias in equities and a reasonable degree of diversication in debt.
However, the elasticity needed to generate these results is at the lower end of estimates
reported in the literature. If we make the common assumption that consumers are somewhat
more risk-averse than logarithmic (coecient of constant relative risk aversion of 1.5), then
the intratemporal elasticity of substitution needs to be around 0.5 to generate realistic equity
home bias. Even then, the model predicts too little diversication in debt for the U.S. For
intratemporal elasticities greater than 1, the model counterfactually predicts that agents
will short foreign bonds. For commonly used parameter values, the standard two-good
model understates bond diversication and overstates equity diversication.
We conduct our analysis using a simple two-good innite-horizon endowment economy
with two stochastic shocks, one each to home and foreign endowments. We focus on char-
acterizing steady-state portfolios. The advantage of the model's simplicity is that we can
derive locally accurate closed-form expressions for steady-state portfolios for arbitrary pa-
rameter values. We adopt the solution technique of Devereux and Sutherland [2006], who
show how to solve for steady-state portfolios by analyzing second-order approximations of
portfolio Euler equations and rst-order approximations of the non-portfolio equations of
the model.
In our two-shock model, we show that either two equities or two bonds is sucient
to attain complete rst-order risk-sharing. Therefore, introducing both equities and bonds
simultaneously would result in zero gross positions for bonds. We proceed instead by
comparing two dierent asset trading regimes. In the rst, households trade only equity
claims. In the second, household trade only locally-denominated bonds. In order to analyze
equity and bonds simultaneously, one would need a model with at least four shocks. In fact,
1Anecdotal evidence suggests that overseas holdings of real bonds are smaller but still non-trivial. For
example, foreign and international investors purchased 8% of all U.S. Treasury Ination-Protected Securities
(TIPS) auctioned between 2000 and 2008 (U.S. Treasury Oce of Debt Management).
2some recent work heads in this direction, as we describe below. However, we feel it is useful
to understand how a \standard" two-shock model performs for debt and equity separately,
and that is the contribution of this paper.
The relatively low level of equity diversication observed in the data is often referred
to as the \equity home bias puzzle", since traditional one-good international macro models
predict that countries will diversify heavily in equities in order to optimally share risk.
For example, Lucas [1982] predicts that each country should hold half its nancial wealth
in home equity and half in foreign equity. Baxter and Jermann [1997] introduce non-
diversiable labor income risk that is positively correlated with domestic equity returns,
and they show that this takes the model even further from the data: the model predicts so
much diversication that domestic agents would short domestic stock. Recently, however,
two-good models have had some success in resolving the equity home bias puzzle. Kollmann
[2006] shows that a two-good endowment economy with no labor income risk can generate
equity home bias, and Heathcote and Perri [2007] oer a two-good production economy that
predicts home bias even in the presence of non-diversiable labor income risk. Hnatkovska
[2008] and Evans and Hnatkovska [2005] develop models of equity diversication with a
single traded good and country-specic non-traded goods. The equity regime version of our
model is substantially the same as in Kollmann [2006] and Coeurdacier [2009]. However,
Kollmann [2006] and Coeurdacier [2009] derive analytical solutions only for a two-period
version of the model. We show formally that the two-period equilibrium portfolios are also
the steady-state portfolios of the innite-horizon model.
There has been relatively less theoretical attention to international diversication in
debt. A number of recent papers introduce debt and equity together in two-good models:
see Engel and Matsumoto [2006], Pavlova and Rigobon [2003], Coeurdacier et al. [2008]
and Coeurdacier and Gourinchas [2008]. However, all of these studies have more than two
shocks in order to avoid portfolio indeterminacy. The new shocks (in addition to standard
endowment or productivity shocks, common to all the models) range from monetary shocks
(Engel and Matsumoto [2006]) to investment shocks (Coeurdacier et al. [2008]) to various
kinds of demand shocks (Pavlova and Rigobon [2003]). Furthermore, most of these studies
introduce bonds in order to improve the predictions of the model for equity portfolios, rather
than to study debt portfolios per se. We adopt a dierent (and complementary) approach.
Rather than add additional shocks, we study equities and bonds separately and compare
the implications of the model for the two asset classes.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3, we
present and discuss our results for equilibrium portfolios under the two asset trading regimes




The model economy consists of two countries, denoted home (H) and foreign (F). Each
country features a \Lucas tree" that delivers a stochastic endowment of a country-specic
good, Y i
t , with i 2 fH;Fg. Country endowments (in logs) are assumed to follow a joint
AR(1) process:
logY H




t = logY F
t 1 + F
t (2)
where 0   < 1 and t  (H
t ;F
t ) is a vector of zero-mean iid shocks with variance-
covariance matrix . These endowment shocks are the only source of uncertainty in the
model. We do not distinguish between \capital" and \labor" income in this model, though
it would be a straightforward extension to add non-diversiable labor income.
Each country is populated with a continuum of identical households of mass 1. House-
holds in country i have preferences dened over a country-specic composite consumption
good. We assume consumption home bias, so country i places a higher weight on i as op-











where 0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount factor and  > 0 is the (constant) coecient
of relative risk aversion. Ci
t denotes country i's consumption of its composite consumption



















, i 6= j (4)
where C
i;j
t denotes country i's consumption of endowment good j; 0 < i < 1 is the
weight that i households place on their own endowment good; and  > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution between H and F endowment goods. The assumption of consumption home
bias imposes 1=2 < i  1. Moreover, we focus here on the special case of symmetric
consumption home bias, where H = F  .
Prices are perfectly exible, and there are no nominal shocks, so the law of one price
holds for H and F endowment goods. Let Pi
t denote the price of endowment good i in
terms of a numeraire (to be specied shortly). The consumer price index in country i, Pi
C;t,
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2 = 1 (6)
It is now straightforward to dene the terms of trade and the real exchange rate. The
(home country's) terms of trade TOTt are dened as the price of a home endowment good







We dene the real exchange rate RERt as the price of a home consumption good in







Note that an increase in RERt represents a real exchange rate appreciation.
In each of the asset trading regimes described below, there are two nancial assets: a
home asset and a foreign asset. Let A
i;j
t 1 denote country i's holdings of country j's asset at
the end of period t 1, to be carried into period t. Note that asset holdings, asset prices and
asset returns are all expressed in terms of the numeraire, which is the world price index.
Let R
j
t denote the real (gross) return on country j's asset. The budget constraint for a



















t denote country i's nancial wealth at the end of period t (in
















Here we are taking the foreign asset to be the \reference asset", and we are rewriting both
countries' budget constraints in terms of holdings of the home asset, A
i;H
t 1. The behavior of
asset returns will be described below. A representative household in country i maximizes
(3) subject to (4) and (10), taking goods prices and asset prices as given.
2.2 Asset Trading Regimes
We consider two asset trading regimes. In the rst, households trade equity claims on the
home and foreign endowments. In the second, households trade locally-denominated bonds.
52.2.1 Regime 1: Equities
In the equity regime, there are two tradable equity claims. Each represents a claim on
one country's endowment stream. Thus, under this regime, all income risk is explicitly
diversiable. Recall that asset prices and returns are denominated in terms of the numeraire
(world price index). Let Pi
E;t denote the price of one share of country i's equity. Returns
























2.2.2 Regime 2: Bonds
In the bond regime, there are two locally-denominated bonds. The home bond oers a
constant stream of payos in home goods; the foreign bond oers a constant stream of
payos in foreign goods. Let Pi
B;t denote the price of the bond that delivers good i. Returns









where Y is the steady-state value of the endowment.3 We assume that bonds are in zero










t = 0 (16)
2.2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
For either trading regime, the rst-order conditions for the home household can be written
as follows (assuming H = F = ):
2Note that A
i;j
t represents country i's holdings of country j's equity measured in value terms (in terms
of world goods).
3The dependence of bond payos on Y is just a convenient normalization that makes the steady-state







































































































































t+1 is the one-period-ahead stochastic discount factor for country i expressed
in terms of the numeraire.












t = Y F
t (28)




t), nancial wealth (Wi
t), goods prices (Pi
t, Pi




t) and portfolio holdings (A
i;H
t ) such that:
1. Households' choices for consumption and portfolio holdings are optimal, taking goods
prices and asset prices as given.
2. All goods and asset markets clear.
3. Expectations are formed rationally.
73 Equilibrium Portfolios
3.1 Regime 1: Equities
In the appendix, we derive the following expression for the steady-state equity portfolio,
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(29)
There is home bias in equity holdings if ShE > 1=2. To build some intuition, we consider
a few special cases. We then calculate portfolio shares for dierent values of the structural
parameters and discuss the conditions under which realistic home bias attains.
3.1.1 Special Case: No consumption home bias
If  = 1=2, then households in both countries place equal weight on home and foreign





Here all households hold perfectly balanced portfolios of half home equity and half
foreign equity. When there is no consumption home bias, the model is equivalent to a
one-good model, and the real exchange rate always equals unity. The only sources of
uncertainty are the endowment shocks themselves, which are perfectly correlated with the
equity payos. Thus, as in Lucas [1982], agents achieve complete risk-sharing by holding
perfectly diversied portfolios.
3.1.2 Special Case: Portfolio indeterminacy with unit elasticities
If  =  = 1, then preferences are logarithmic over the composite consumption good,
which in turn is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of home and foreign endowment goods. Both
the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution are 1. In this case, (29) is
indeterminate. This is the famous result of Cole and Obstfeld [1991]: when elasticities of
substitution are unity, endogenous variation in the terms of trade provides perfect insurance
against endowment shocks, and asset trade becomes redundant. In this case, complete risk-
sharing always attains, and any market-clearing portfolio shares could be considered an
equilibrium.
4Since we assume that equities are in positive net supply and the model is symmetric, the expression for
ShE is also the share of home (foreign) households' nancial wealth allocated to home (foreign) equity. This
reasoning will not carry over to bonds, however, because bonds are in zero net supply; steady-state wealth
in the bond regime is 0.
83.1.3 General Case
To get a sense for how the equity portfolio depends on , we set  = 1:5, so households are
more risk-averse than log-investors.5 We also set  = 0:875, corresponding to a steady-state
import share of 12:5%. This is roughly the value observed for the United States in recent
years; see Coeurdacier [2009]. Figure 2 plots ShE for values of  ranging from 0:3 to 6. Note
that around  = 1:43, portfolios are indeterminate; this corresponds to the Cole/Obstfeld
result discussed in the previous subsection (given that  is now 1:5). For  greater than
about 1:43, there is equity foreign bias. Although this is counterfactual, it is a common
prediction of single-good open economy models; this is the well known \equity home bias
puzzle" or \international diversication puzzle". For  less than about 1.43, there is equity
home bias. However, for 1   < 1:43, there is too much equity home bias; for these
parameters, home households would hold more than 100% of the home equity by shorting
foreign stocks, which is counterfactual. On the other hand, for  < 1, we do see realistic
predictions for home equity bias. For example, if  = 0:5, then the share of home equities
held by home households is 81%, roughly the share for the U.S. in 2005.
Table 1 tabulates ShE for dierent values of  and , holding  constant at 0:875 as
before (the value for the U.S.). Note that to get realistic home bias, we need to assume
that  is small,  is small, or both. For example, we get realistic home bias if (;) is
around (1:5;0:5) (see previous paragraph) or around (0:5;2:5). Since most estimates of 
in the literature are greater than 1, the former case is arguably more plausible. Estimates
for  vary widely; 0:5 is at the low end of commonly used values (see Coeurdacier [2009]
and Heathcote and Perri [2007]). There are at least two ways to think of this result. The
\glass half full view" is that low substitutability between domestic and foreign goods oers
a way out of the equity home bias puzzle. The \glass half empty view" is that such a low
elasticity of substitution is unrealistic; a better model should be able to match the data
on equity diversication with a higher elasticity. We don't take a stand on this particular
point here. Rather, we simply point out that a two-country, two-good endowment model
requires a fairly low intratemporal elasticity of substitution (or alternatively, agents who
are less risk-averse than log-investors) to generate realistic equity home bias.
Figure (3) gives a more visual depiction of the dependence on  and . The red plane
in this gure marks the level ShE = 1, and the yellow plane marks the level ShE = 0:5.
Realistic values for equity home bias correspond to points between the two planes. The
gure conrms that such levels are attained only if  is low,  is low, or both.
Table (2) sets  = 0:6. This represents a more open country than the U.S. Table (2)
shows that decreasing  tends to even out the equilibrium portfolios. Cells that exhibited
strong home bias when  = 0:875 show more moderate home bias when  = 0:6. For
example, when (;) = (1:5;0:5) and  = 0:875, we have ShE = 0:81; when  falls to 0:6,
ShE falls to 0:57. This result is fairly intuitive: when a country is more open to trade
(values home and foreign goods more evenly), households prefer to hold more balanced
portfolios of home and foreign stock.6
5Estimates of  in the literature typically fall between 1 and 2.
6Note that the \evening-out eect" also occurs when there is equity foreign bias. For example, when
93.2 Regime 2: Bonds
In the appendix, we derive the following expression for the steady-state bond portfolio. Here
XB denotes home (foreign) households' holdings of the home (foreign) bond, normalized by
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(31)
Recall that bonds are assumed to be in zero net supply. If no home or foreign bonds are
traded in equilibrium, then XB = 0. If XB > 0, then home households are long the home
bond and short the foreign bond. If XB < 0, then home households are short the home
bond and long the foreign bond. XB < 0 is the more realistic scenario, as it describes a
world where countries actually hold each other's bonds, rather than shorting each other's
bonds. Again, we consider a few special cases before characterizing the general case.
3.2.1 Special case: No consumption home bias
If  = 1=2, then (31) simplies to:
1
2
(   1) (32)
When there is no consumption home bias, bond holdings depend entirely on , the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution. If  > 1, then home households take a long position
in home bonds and a short position in foreign bonds. If  < 1, then home households take a
short position in home bonds and a long position in foreign bonds. If  = 1, both households
take zero positions in both bonds.7 The intuition is that the home (foreign) bond is like
a long (short) bet on the terms of trade. If  = 1, then the terms of trade move one-for-
one against relative endowment shocks, and bonds oer no additional scope for improved
risk-sharing. If  > 1, then after a negative home endowment shock, the terms of trade
improve slightly { but not by enough to fully oset the shock. So home's relative wealth
falls when its endowment falls. Therefore, the home household prefers the asset that pays
more when the home endowment is low { i.e., the home bond. Conversely, if  < 1, the
terms of trade move more than one-for-one against endowment shocks. Now home's relative
wealth would decrease following a positive home endowment shock due to the large terms of
trade deterioration. Therefore, the home household would prefer the asset that pays more
when the home endowment is high { i.e., the foreign bond.
3.2.2 Special case: Unit intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities
If  =  = 1, then (31) simplies to:
(;) = (1:5;4) and  = 0:875, we have She = 0:39; when  falls to 0:6, She rises to 0:49, corresponding to
more moderate (indeed very slight) equity foreign bias.
7Foreign households' bond positions are symmetric. For example, if  > 1, then foreign households take
a long position in foreign bonds and a short position in home bonds.
10XB = 0 (33)
As discussed for equities, when  =  = 1, endogenous movement in the terms of trade
provide perfect insurance against endowment shocks. Therefore complete risk-sharing is
achieved even without asset trade (Cole/Obstfeld indeterminacy). However, in contrast
with the equity regime, the optimal steady-state bond portfolio is uniquely determined:
households take zero positions in both bonds. The intuition, again, is that the home (for-
eign) bond is like a long (short) bet on the terms of trade. In this special case, households
are already completely insured against terms of trade variation. Any additional exposure
via the home or foreign bond would cause households' wealth to oscillate unnecessarily
in response to endowment shocks. Therefore it is optimal for households to refrain from
trading bonds.
3.2.3 General Case
Paralleling our discussion of equities, we now characterize the dependence of bond portfolios
on . From (31), it is clear that the bond portfolio is linear in  { in sharp contrast to the
equity regime. Figure 4 plots XB for values of  ranging from 0:3 to 6, holding  = 1:5 and
 = 0:875. The value of  for which bond portfolios are zero is about 0:86. For  greater
than 0:86, home households are long in home bonds and short in foreign bonds. In other
words, for high levels of , each country shorts the other country's bond in order to increase
exposure to its domestic bond. In this case, bond investments are even less diversied than
in portfolio autarky! Clearly, this is counterfactual. On the other hand, for  less than
0:86, home households are short in home bonds and long in foreign bonds. In this case, the
model correctly predicts positive cross-holdings of bonds.
Table 3 tabulates XB for dierent values of  and , holding  = 0:875. Given   1,
it is clear that  needs to be low in order to generate bond diversication (XB < 0). Any
value for  greater than or equal to 1 would result in home agents shorting the foreign bond,
which is counterfactual. Extending our example from the equity regime, if we take  = 1:5
and  = 0:5, then foreign holdings of home bonds are equal to about 8% of the value of
home bonds.8 Note that this value is low for the U.S. In the data, foreign holdings of U.S.
corporate bonds were 28% of outstanding value at the end of 2007, and foreign holdings of
U.S. Treasuries were 48% of outstanding value. Thus, for a set of parameters that matches
the U.S. on equity diversication, the model understates foreign holdings of U.S. debt.
Figure 5 gives a more visual representation of the dependence of XB on  and . The
blue plane marks the level XB = 0. Points below the plane correspond to diversication
in bonds, while points above the plane correspond to \anti-diversication" (shorting of the
other country's bonds). Once again, it is clear that we need either low , low , or both to
generate bond diversication.
8Since bonds are in zero net supply and wealth is zero in the symmetric steady-state, home holdings of
foreign bonds (and equivalently, foreign holdings of home bonds) are equal to minus home holdings of home
bonds.
11Table 4 sets  = 0:6, which represents a country that is more open to trade than the
U.S. Greater openness to trade (lower ) is associated with more diversied bond portfolios
if diversication is operative (XB < 0) for the parameters (;) under consideration. For
example, for (;) = (1:5;0:5), bond diversication increases from 8% when  = 0:875 to
21% when  = 0:6.
4 Complete First-Order Risk-Sharing
In the appendix, we show formally that home and foreign households achieve complete risk-
sharing under both equity and bond asset trading regimes, to a rst order approximation.
Here we briey explain why that result obtains.
Devereux and Sutherland [2006] show that the steady-state portfolios must satisfy the
following condition, which is derived from a second-order approximation of home and foreign
households' rst-order conditions for portfolio holdings:9
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where the variable d CDRt+1 is given by:
d CDRt+1  ^ CH





d CDRt is the log-deviation of the ratio of H- to F- marginal utility, divided by the real
exchange rate (the price of home consumption in terms of foreign consumption).10 The
model exhibits complete risk-sharing to a rst-order approximation if d CDRt = 0 for all t.
Since there are only two assets in this model (under either regime), the excess return ^ RX
t+1
is a scalar. In the appendix, we show that the only exogenous variable that aects portfolio
determination and risk-sharing is the dierence between home and foreign endowments,
^ Yt+1  ^ Y H
t+1   ^ Y F
t+1. To a rst-order approximation, then, we can express the equilibrium
values for d CDRt+1 and ^ RX
t+1 as linear combinations of (i) a vector of endogenous predeter-
mined state variables ^ St, and (ii) the exogenous variable ^ Yt+1.11 That is:
d CDRt+1 = C;S ^ St + C;Y ^ Yt+1 (36)
^ RX
t+1 = R;S ^ St + R;Y ^ Yt+1 (37)
9All \hatted" variables are log-deviations from steady-state, except for ^ R
X
t+1, which we dene to equal
^ R
H
t+1   ^ R
F
t+1.
10Devereux and Sutherland [2006] dene the real exchange rate as the price of foreign consumption in
terms of home consumption, so our denition of d CDRt+1 diers from theirs by a minus sign.
11By \equilibrium values", we mean the values that embed the optimal steady-state portfolios. In other
words, the coecients in (36) and (37) depend on (potentially unknown) steady-state portfolio holdings.
See the appendix and Devereux and Sutherland [2006] for details.
12In the appendix, we show that ^ St in this model is just a single endogenous state variable
that is always zero if the economy starts from the steady-state.12 We can therefore write:
Et
h
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Then, for (34) to hold (i.e., for portfolios to be optimal), we must have R;Y = 0,
C;Y = 0 or both. But if R;Y = 0, then the returns on the two assets are always equal
regardless of realized endowment shocks. In this case, portfolio holdings are indeterminate
and complete risk-sharing always obtains, as in Cole and Obstfeld [1991]. In general, R;Y
will dier from zero. Whenever it does, we have C;Y = 0. From (36), this implies that
d CDRt = 0 for all t; i.e., we have complete rst-order risk-sharing.
It is important to note that complete rst-order risk-sharing does not necessarily imply
complete risk-sharing in a non-approximated solution, nor does it imply that asset markets
are necessarily complete. For example, under the equity regime, there is incomplete risk-
sharing at higher orders of approximation whenever (i) home and foreign households place
dierent consumption weights on home and foreign goods, and (ii) preferences are not log-
separable across time and goods. However, complete rst-order risk-sharing means that
introducing three or more assets into a two-shock model would render one or more of the
assets redundant { at least for the purposes of computing steady-state portfolios using
the Devereux and Sutherland [2006] methodology. To analyze equity and bond portfolios
simultaneously, one would need a model with at least four shocks. This is an area of active
and future research (see Coeurdacier et al. [2008] and Coeurdacier and Gourinchas [2008]).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that a two-country, two-good DSGE endowment model can
generate both equity home bias and bond diversication if the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods is suciently low. However, the elasticity required is at
the low end of estimates reported in the literature and corresponds to a world where goods
are not strong substitutes across countries. Moreover, when the model is calibrated to match
equity home bias for the U.S., it underpredicts the share of U.S. debt held by foreigners.
A richer model with investment and/or non-traded goods could potentially match the facts
for equity and bond diversication with more realistic parameter values.
Most of the literature on international portfolio choice, including this paper, has focused
on steady-state portfolios. However, there are many interesting questions about portfolio
dynamics that can be addressed within this class of models. For example, how should
households re-balance their portfolios in response to a foreign shock? Can such re-balancing
be an important propagation mechanism for international business cycles? The dynamics
become even more interesting in richer models with multiple shocks and multiple assets.
12This is true for both the equity and bond regimes. Starting the economy at the steady-state is a natural
assumption, given that we approximate the model around the steady-state.
13What kinds of shocks would lead households to substitute between debt and equity within
a country, and what would lead households to substitute from home to foreign holdings
within an asset class? Can such models help us understand why many emerging market
countries have tilted their portfolios towards U.S. debt in recent years? We hope to address
these questions in future research.
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15Appendix
A Solution For Equity and Bond Portfolios
Our solution approach is based on Devereux and Sutherland [2006]. They use second-
order approximations of the portfolio equations (i.e., the rst-order conditions for portfolio
holdings) and rst-order approximations of all non-portfolio equations to jointly solve for the
rst-order behavior of non-portfolio variables and the zero-order (steady-state) values for
portfolio holdings. All non-portfolio variables are approximated around the non-stochastic
steady-state. In this section, we explain in detail how we implemented this approach to
derive the closed-form solutions for steady-state equity and bond holdings given in (29) and
(31).
A.1 Non-Stochastic Steady-State
In our model we approximate around the symmetric non-stochastic steady-state, which can
be characterized as follows:
MH = MF =  (39)




PH = PF = PH
C = PF
C = TOT = RER = 1 (41)
CH = CF = Y H = Y F = Y (42)
CH;H = CF;F = Y (43)
CH;F = CF;H = (1   )Y (44)
In addition, for the equity regime we have:
WH = WF = W = PH
E = PF




And for the bond regime we have:
WH = WF = 0 (46)
PH
B = PF




A.2 Terms of trade, real exchange rate, and relative consumption expen-
ditures
Our rst step is to derive rst-order approximations relating the terms of trade, the real
exchange rate and relative consumption expenditures to relative endowments. The resulting
16equations will be re-used often to derive both the equity and bond portfolios. This step
parallels Coeurdacier [2009] quite closely.
Begin by combining the intratemporal rst-order conditions (17), (18), (22) and (23)































 + (1   )x
x + (1   )
Now dene the real exchange rate RERt and relative (home divided by foreign) con-






























Log-linearize (49) around the symmetric steady-state to get:
  d TOTt + (2   1)
h
(   1) d RERt + d PCt
i
= ^ Y H
t   ^ Y F
t (50)
Except where stated otherwise, \hatted" variables denote log-deviations from steady-
state: ^ Xt  log(Xt=X).13 Next, log-linearize the expressions for the price indices (5):
^ PH
C;t =  ^ PH
t + (1   ) ^ PF
t (51)
^ PF
C;t =  ^ PF
t + (1   ) ^ PH
t (52)
We can now express the log-linearized real exchange rate as follows:
d RERt = ^ PH
C;t   ^ PF
C;t =  d TOTt (53)
where   2   1
Combining (50) and (53) and solving for d TOTt:
13The exceptions are ^ R
X
t and ^ W
i
t (for bonds); these will be dened below.
17d TOTt =  d PCt    ^ Y
H;F
t (54)
where   

   2(   1)
 1 and ^ Y
H;F
t  ^ Y H
t   ^ Y F
t
Equation (54) provides a link between TOTt and PCt (both endogenous) and Y
H;F
t
(exogenous). We will reuse this expression repeatedly when deriving steady-state equity
and bond portfolios.




t+1   ^ CH
t )   ( ^ PH
C;t+1   ^ PH







t+1   ^ CF
t )   ( ^ PF
C;t+1   ^ PF




Now subtract (55) from (56), rearrange, and use the denitions of d RERt and d PCt:
Et
h
d PCt+1   (   1) d RERt+1
i
= d PCt   (   1) d RERt (57)
Substitute (53) into (57):
Et
h
d PCt+1   (   1) d TOTt+1
i
= d PCt   (   1) d TOTt (58)
And now substitute (54) into (58) and rearrange to get:




 (   1)(1   )
   2 (   1)
(60)
Equation (59) provides an expression for expected one-period-ahead relative consump-
tion expenditures. We will also make use of this equation when deriving steady-state equity
and bond portfolios.
A.3 Equity Portfolios
Now consider the equity trading regime. Recall that equities are assumed to be in positive
net supply, so steady-state wealth under this regime is positive. The log-linearized budget
















C;t+1 + ^ CH
t+1


















C;t+1 + ^ CF
t+1

+ ~ AF;H ^ RX
t+1 (62)




t+1  ^ RH
t+1   ^ RF
t+1
18Note that Ai;H denotes country i's holdings of home equity. Given a solution for ~ Ai;H,
we have Ai;H = W ~ Ai;H, where steady-state wealth W is given by (45). ^ RX
t+1 is the (log)
excess return on home equity over foreign equity.






t ) and the steady-state equations, one can show the following:
^ WF
t = ^ PH
E;t + ^ PF





  ~ AH;H (64)
By log-linearizing (11), we can also derive an expression for ^ RX
t+1:
^ RX
t+1 = ( ^ PH
E;t+1   ^ PF
E;t+1)   ( ^ PH
E;t   ^ PF
E;t) + (1   ) d TOTt+1 + (1   )^ Y
H;F
t+1 (65)
Substitute (63), (64) and (65) into the foreign budget constraint (62) to get:
2 ^ PF


































t+1   ~ A ^ RX
t+1 (66)
where ~ A  ~ AH;H 
AH;H
W


























t  ^ WH
t   ^ PF
E;t
Equation (67) is just a linear combination of the home and foreign (log-linearized) budget
constraints. It is also a dierence equation in d WP
H;F
t . Following Devereux and Sutherland
[2006], we note that ^ RX
t+1 is a mean-zero iid random variable (to a rst-order approximation),
so it will not aect the eigenvalues of the log-linearized system. We therefore introduce the
variable t+1:
t+1  ~ A ^ RX
t+1 (68)
where t+1 is also a mean-zero random variable. Solving (67) forward, applying the





















where we used the fact that Et+1[t+1+i] = 0 for all i > 0. Next, we can use equations
(54) and (59) to show that:
Et+1
h
d PCt+1+i + d TOTt+1+i
i
= (1 +  )d PCt+1 +
2
4(1 +  )
i 1 X
j=0










d PCt+1+i + d TOTt+1+i
i
=




(1 +  )    (1   )






Now substitute (71) into (69) and solve for d PCt+1:




















(1 +  ) + (1    )(1   )







1 +  
Equation (72) expresses relative consumption expenditures as a function of the endoge-
nous state variable, d WP
H;F
t , the exogenous relative endowment, ^ Y
H;F
t+1 , and the realized
excess return on the home portfolio, t+1. To implement the technique in Devereux and
Sutherland [2006], we need to nd a similar expression for the variable d CDRt+1:
d CDRt+1  ^ CH





To do this, note that d CDRt+1 is related to d PCt+1 as follows:
















   2 (   1)

,  
 (   1)

20where the last line above follows from (54). Substituting (72) into (74) gives the desired
expression:

























The next piece we need to implement Devereux and Sutherland [2006] is an expression
for ^ RX
t+1 in terms of state variables. Start by substituting (54) into (65) to get:
^ RX
t+1 = ( ^ PH
E;t+1   ^ PF
E;t+1)   ( ^ PH
E;t   ^ PF
E;t) +  (1   )d PCt+1 + (1    )(1   )^ Y
H;F
t+1 (76)
Equation (76) is a dierence equation in ^ PH
E;t   ^ PF
E;t. Solve it forward, apply the Et[]
operator, and invoke the appropriate transversality condition to get:
^ PH
E;t   ^ PF
E;t =  d PCt +







Iterate (77) forward one period and substitute it back into (76):
^ RX
t+1 =  ( ^ PH
E;t   ^ PF
E;t) +  d PCt+1 +

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E   1 , 
RX;WP





E   
PC;Y HF
E +




E   
PC;
E (80)
Equation (79) expresses the excess return ^ RX
t+1 as a function of the endogenous state
variables, ^ PH
E;t   ^ PF
E;t and d WP
H;F
t , the relative endowment, ^ Y
H;F
t+1 , and the excess return on
the home portfolio, t+1.
Devereux and Sutherland [2006] show that a second-order approximation of the home
and foreign portfolio FOCs (20) and (25) imply:
Et
h




The steady-state portfolio ~ A is dened to be the one that satises (81). To solve for ~ A,
rst set t+1 = ~ A ^ RX


































Next set t+1 = ~ A ^ RX
t+1 in (75):










E ~ A ^ RX
t+1 (83)
















The solution for steady-state home (foreign) holdings of home (foreign) equity, expressed







WF =  ~ A (85)
Evaluating (85) and simplifying gives expression (29) in the main text.
As a double-check, we also solved for d CDRt+1 and ^ RX
t+1 computationally using an
undetermined coecients algorithm based on Uhlig [1997]. We then recomputed the steady-
state portfolio share from the numerical results using (84) and (85). The results were
identical using the analytical and numerical techniques.
The expression for A=W in the text (29) also coincides with the exact analytical solution
derived by Kollmann [2006] in an analogous two-period model. Our result generalizes the
result of Kollmann [2006] in the following sense: we have shown that the exact portfolios in
the two-period model correspond to the steady-state portfolios in an innite-horizon model.
In the innite-horizon model, the exact solutions for portfolios also have higher-order terms
which capture dynamic portfolio re-balancing. These higher-order terms are beyond the
scope of this paper, but they are of interest for future work.
A.4 Bond Portfolios
We now turn to the bond trading regime. The steps to solve for steady-state bond portfolios
parallel the steps for equities very closely. The main dierence is that unlike equities, bonds
are assumed to be in zero net supply. As a result, steady-state wealth is zero.14 As a
technicality, we can no longer characterize wealth in terms of log deviations from steady-
state; instead, we describe the dynamics of wealth in terms of level deviations.
14This actually follows Devereux and Sutherland [2006] more closely, since they also approximate around
a point where wealth is zero.






t + ^ PH
t+1 + ^ Y H
t+1   ^ PH
C;t+1   ^ CH







t + ^ PF
t+1 + ^ Y F
t+1   ^ PF
C;t+1   ^ CF
t+1 + ~ AF;H ^ RX
t+1 (87)




t+1  ^ RH











Since bonds are in zero net supply, we have:
~ AF;H =   ~ AH;H
^ WF
t =   ^ WH
t






t + ^ PF
t+1 + ^ Y F
t+1   ^ PF
C;t+1   ^ CF
t+1   ~ AH;H ^ RX
t+1 (88)






t + d TOTt+1 + ^ Y
H;F
t+1   d PCt+1 + 2 ~ A ^ RX
t+1 (89)
where ~ A  ~ AH;H 
AH;H
Y
Now solve (89) forward, apply the Et+1[] operator, invoke the appropriate transversality
condition, and solve for d PCt+1 (using (54) and (59)) to get:


















(1    )(1   )   (1    )






1    
Note that equation (74), relating the variable d CDRt+1 to d PCt+1, remains valid for
bonds. Therefore the solution for d CDRt+1 is given by:
























23We now seek a similar solution for ^ RX
t+1. Log-linearizing the return on bonds (14), we
can write:
^ RX
t+1 = ( ^ PH
B;t+1   ^ PF
B;t+1)   ( ^ PH
B;t   ^ PF
B;t) + (1   ) d TOTt+1 (92)
Solve (92) forward, apply the Et[] operator, invoke the appropriate transversality con-
dition, and use equation (59) to derive:
^ PH
B;t   ^ PF
B;t =  d PCt +







Iterate (93) forward one period, substitute it back into (92), and use (54) to get:
^ RX
t+1 =  ( ^ PH
B;t   ^ PF
B;t) +  d PCt+1 +






























B   1 , 
RX;W





B   
PC;Y HF
B +




B   
PC;
B
The solution for the ~ A takes the same form as the solution under the equity regime. In















Actual bond holdings are related to ~ A as follows:
A = AH;H = AF;F = Y ~ A (97)
Recall that steady-state wealth W is zero under the bond regime, so the share of wealth
allocated to the home bond is not a well-dened quantity. In the main text, we report home








= (1   ) ~ A (98)
24B Complete First-Order Risk-Sharing
In this section we demonstrate that complete risk-sharing attains under both the equity and
bond asset trading regimes, to a rst-order approximation. We provide a detailed proof for
the equity regime. The proof for the bond regime is analogous.
Complete risk-sharing holds in general if the ratio of marginal utilities across countries
equals the real exchange rate. We limit our attention here to a rst-order characterization
of risk-sharing. We say that complete rst-order risk-sharing attains if the log-linearized
ratio of marginal utilities across countries equals the log-linearized real exchange rate. This
is equivalent to showing that d CDRt+1 is zero. We proceed in three steps. First, we show
that d CDRt+1 does not depend on time-(t + 1) shocks. Instead, it depends only on the
value of a single predetermined state variable. Second, we show that this state variable is
constant over time. Finally, setting the state variable to zero at time 0 completes the proof.
Start by observing that equations (72), (75) and (79) provide expressions for d PCt+1,
d CDRt+1 and ^ RX
t+1 in terms of the predetermined variables d WP
H;F
t and ^ P
H;F
E;t ( ^ PH
E;t  ^ PF
E;t);
the exogenous variable ^ Y
H;F
t+1 ; and the excess return on the home portfolio, t+1. t+1 is
dened to equal ~ A ^ RX
t+1. Substitute this into (79) to get:
^ RX



















E , i 2 fPHF;WP;Y HFg
Next, substitute t+1  ~ A ^ RX
t+1 into (75), and replace ^ RX
t+1 using (99), to get:



































E ~ A~ 
RX;Y HF
E
Now note that we have a solution for the steady-state portfolio variable ~ A from (84).
Substituting this into the expression for ~ 
CDR;Y HF
E , it is straightforward to show that
~ 
CDR;Y HF
E = 0. Therefore d CDRt+1 does not depend on time-(t + 1) shocks, and we have:


















We will show that ^ St+1 = ^ St for all t; i.e., ^ St is constant. In what follows, it will be helpful
to have an expression for d PCt+1 analogous to (99) and (100). This is easily obtained by
substituting t+1  ~ A ^ RX
t+1 into (72), and replacing ^ RX
t+1 using (99):



































E ~ A~ 
RX;Y HF
E
Next solve (67) for c W
H;F









(1 +  )(1   )
2
d PCt+1  




t+1 + ~ A ^ RX
t+1 (103)
From (77) we have:
^ P
H;F
E;t+1 =  d PCt+1 +







Combining (103) and (104), we can write:
















t + 1d PCt+1 + 2^ Y
H;F
t+1 + ~ 
CDR;WP
E ~ A ^ RX
t+1 (105)
where 1   ~ 
CDR;PHF
E  


















Now substitute (102) and (99) into (105) to get:















E  1~ 
PC;PHF
E + ~ 
CDR;WP










E + 1~ 
PC;WP
E + ~ 
CDR;WP





E  1~ 
PC;Y HF
E + 2 + ~ 
CDR;WP
E ~ A~ 
RX;Y HF
E
It is straightforward (though tedious) to show that ~ 
S;PHF
E = ~ 
CDR;PHF





E and ~ 
S;Y HF
E = 0. Therefore we have:








t = ^ St (107)
26So we have shown that the endogenous variable ^ St is constant over time. This completes
the second step of the proof. To nish the proof, assume that the economy starts in the
steady-state.15 That is, at time zero, all non-portfolio variables take on their non-stochastic
steady-state values (given at the start of the appendix), and ~ A0 equals its endogenous
steady-state value (given by (84)). Therefore ^ S0 = 0. It follows from (107) and (101) that
d CDRt = 0 for all t.
The proof of complete rst-order risk-sharing in the bond regime is analogous to the




B;t   ^ PF
B;t) and ^ WH
t . To be precise, the relevant constant state variable ^ St for bonds
is:






























B , i 2 PHF;W
where ~ A is now given by (96).
15This is the natural starting point for the economy, given that we approximate around the steady-state.
Note that stochastic shocks begin to hit the economy at time t = 1.
27Table 1: Calculated values for ShE, the share of home equity held by home households, for
dierent values of  and  ( = 0:875).
= 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 4 6
0.5 1.5909 1.3276 1.1667 0.9800 0.8750 0.7000 0.6364
1 0.5000 0.5000 { 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
1.5 0.8077 0.9211 1.1667 -3.5000 0.0000 0.3889 0.4375
2 0.8750 0.9800 1.1667 3.5000 -0.7000 0.3182 0.4016
5 0.9486 1.0363 1.1667 1.7973 24.5000 0.1522 0.3273
Table 2: Calculated values for ShE, the share of home equity held by home households, for
dierent values of  and  ( = 0:6).
= 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 4 6
0.5 0.2727 0.0000 3.0000 0.6923 0.6000 0.5342 0.5207
1 0.5000 0.5000 { 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
1.5 0.5676 0.6316 3.0000 0.4286 0.4648 0.4884 0.4930
2 0.6000 0.6923 3.0000 0.3913 0.4468 0.4825 0.4895
5 0.6563 0.7941 3.0000 0.3214 0.4138 0.4719 0.4832
Table 3: Calculated values for XB, the holdings of the home bond by home households
(divided by the price of a home bond), for dierent values of  and  ( = 0:875).
= 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 4 6
0.5 -0.2031 -0.1484 -0.0938 0.0156 0.1250 0.5625 1.0000
1 -0.1094 -0.0547 0.0000 0.1094 0.2188 0.6563 1.0938
1.5 -0.0781 -0.0234 0.0313 0.1406 0.2500 0.6875 1.1250
2 -0.0625 -0.0078 0.0469 0.1563 0.2656 0.7031 1.1406
5 -0.0344 0.0203 0.0750 0.1844 0.2938 0.7313 1.1688
Table 4: Calculated values for XB, the holdings of the home bond by home households
(divided by the price of a home bond), for dierent values of  and  ( = 0:6).
= 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 4 6
0.5 -0.3200 -0.2000 -0.0800 0.1600 0.4000 1.3600 2.3200
1 -0.2400 -0.1200 0.0000 0.2400 0.4800 1.4400 2.4000
1.5 -0.2133 -0.0933 0.0267 0.2667 0.5067 1.4667 2.4267
2 -0.2000 -0.0800 0.0400 0.2800 0.5200 1.4800 2.4400
5 -0.1760 -0.0560 0.0640 0.3040 0.5440 1.5040 2.4640
28Figure 1: Foreign holdings of dierent U.S. nancial assets, expressed as fractions of the
outstanding values of those assets. Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, author's calcu-
lations.
29Figure 2: Share of home equity owned by home households ShE for dierent values of ,
the intratemporal elasticity of substitution. The coecient of relative risk aversion, , is
set to 1:5; and the consumption home bias parameter, , is set to 0:875, corresponding to
a steady-state import share of 12:5%.
30Figure 3: Share of home equity owned by home households ShE for dierent values of  and
. The consumption home bias parameter, , is set to 0:875, corresponding to a steady-state
import share of 12:5%. The red plane marks the level ShE = 1, and the yellow plane marks
the level ShE = 0:5.
31Figure 4: Home households' holdings of the home bond XB (as a fraction of home bond
price), for dierent values of , the intratemporal elasticity of substitution. The coecient
of relative risk aversion, , is set to 1:5; and the consumption home bias parameter, , is
set to 0:875, corresponding to a steady-state import share of 12:5%.
32Figure 5: Home households' holdings of the home bond XB (as a fraction of home bond
price), for dierent values of  and . The consumption home bias parameter, , is set to
0:875, corresponding to a steady-state import share of 12:5%. The blue plane marks the
level XB = 0.
33